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Why is the History of Heterosexuality Essential? Beliefs about the History of
Sexuality and Their Relationship to Sexual Prejudice
It is almost a truism of social psychology that high status identities are taken as the basis for social norms, and that those norms are then considered to apply to everyone. Such conflations reinforce inequality when they allow dominant group identities to use themselves as a standard for judging others (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) or to recruit lower status group members' agency into serving the higher status group's agenda (Simon & Oakes, 2006) . Many traditions of critical thought share the Hegelian assumption that dominance requires the illusion that the subordinate "other" is dispensable to the dominant group, even while the dominant group critically rely on the "other" for its ways of being. The analysis is common to such domains as class (Marx & Engels, 1978) , gender (de Beauvoir, 1949 (de Beauvoir, /2011 , colonization (Said, 1978) , and, of course, sexuality (Warner, 1993) .
Psychologists have also taken note of the tendency to conflate heterosexuality with universal categories such as society, nature, culture, and history. Herek (2007) distinguished sexual stigma at two levels of analysis; heterosexist ideology and sexual prejudice, describing the heterosexual ideology embedded in cultural practices as one that presumes and prescribes heterosexuality as a way of being for everyone. Other researchers have called this ideology heteronormativity (e.g., Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004; Warner, 1993) . Heterosexist ideology is distinct from sexual prejudice, which Herek (2007) describes as the overt behavioural manifestation of sexual stigma. The effects of sexual stigma on the well-being of sexual minority people such as gay, lesbian and bisexual people are multiple and well documented (Meyer, 2003) In recent decades, research psychologists have been advised to resist heterosexism by writing in an even-handed way about homosexuality and heterosexuality (Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991) . People typically explain differences between sexual identity groups by linguistically positioning heterosexuality as the norm for comparison, rendering the psychology of sexual minority groups as 'the effect to be explained' . Even scientists who express a desire to explain group differences in even-handed ways can end up focusing their explanations on sexual minority people (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001 ). Such asymmetric explanations have consequences for stereotyping. When one group is linguistically positioned as the norm and another as "the effect to be explained," readers draw the conclusion that the former group is the one with greater power and agency (Bruckmüller & Abele, 2010; Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele, 2012) . As such, the advice to focus explanatory attention on heterosexuality appears to be sound, but difficult to follow in practice.
Informed by such analyses of heterosexist ideology, and the evidence their effects on scientific thinking about group differences the present article aims to examine essentialist beliefs about sexuality from a fresh angle. To be specific, research on essentialist beliefs about sexuality have often implicitly or explicitly focused on beliefs about homosexuality, such that beliefs about heterosexuality have remained unexamined. Moreover, beliefs about components of sexuality -love, identity, behaviour and desire -have not been empirically investigated. The two studies in this paper demonstrate the importance of addressing both issues. Before describing the studies, we review the development of psychologists' interest in and understanding of essentialist beliefs about sexuality and detail how our work constitutes a fresh take on this area of growing interest.
Essentialist Beliefs About Sexuality
Essentialism is the belief that complex phenomena, such as social identities, are caused by unseen causes, such as genes, and that the actions of these agents can explain the particular characteristics of these phenomena (Medin, 1989) . Research on essentialist beliefs about homosexuality has progressed in three waves. The attributional theory of stigma predicted that people would respond more harshly to a stigmatized target whose behaviour was perceived to be under personal control (Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1989) . This theory inspired Whitley's (1990) research which showed that heterosexuals who consider sexual orientation a matter of personal choice espoused more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. However, the argument that beliefs about personal choice were a cause of tolerant attitudes towards lesbians and gay men never gained support. Experiments which tested the effects of manipulating beliefs about sexual orientation on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men produced very mixed findings and frequent null results (see Hegarty, 2010; Hegarty & Golden, 2008 for discussion) . Close analysis of historical shifts in public opinion in the United States also fail to support the idea that heterosexual Americans became more gay-friendly in recent years as a consequence of an a shift in their beliefs about the immutability of sexuality (Lewis, 2009) .
A second wave of research was inspired by increased interest in essentialism in the interdisciplinary study of sexuality (DeCecco & Elia, 1993 , DeCecco & Parker, 1995 Stein, 1990) . Researchers tended to assume that beliefs about the 'essence' of group identity tended to be ideologically influenced and served the purpose of rationalizing inequality (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997) . However, sexuality appeared to some psychologists to be an exception to this rule, because heterosexual people who thought sexual orientation was genetically 6 determined expressed more positive attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (e.g., Bem, 1998) . This tension was first addressed by Hegarty and Pratto (2001; Hegarty, 2002) who showed that beliefs in the 'immutability' of sexual orientation were negatively correlated with the belief that lesbians and gay men were 'fundamentally' different from heterosexuals. Furthermore, immutability beliefs were correlated with positive attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, and fundamentality beliefs were correlated were negative attitudes.
Similarly Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (2000) described beliefs about social groups as varying about the extent to which those group were perceived as natural, and as discrete, bounded entities. These dimensions of 'naturalness' and 'entiativity' were found to be influenced by the status of the groups in question. Whilst two groups may be considered just as natural as each other, lower status groups were viewed as more homogeneous and more of an entity than higher status groups. Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (2002) later observed that gay men were believed to be a more 'entitative' and less 'natural' group than two other lower status groups; women and Black people. In this later study, essentialist beliefs were correlated with sexual prejudice, but not with either sexism or racism.
Whilst the research of Hegarty, Haslam and their colleagues suggested that belief in the discreteness of sexual identity categories is related to prejudice, Falomir and Mugny (2009) reasoned that some heterosexual men might find gay men easier to tolerate if they were reassured of a categorical boundary between these two groups.
In support of this idea, they found that only heterosexual men who were threatened by homosexuality reported reduced prejudice toward gay men when presented with a biological argument about sexuality. In total this wave of research suggested that essentialist beliefs have no "essential" relationship to prejudice, and that essentialist 7 beliefs could also be consequences of individual and group-based motives (see also Verkuyten, 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 1997) .
A third wave of research was initiated by Haslam and Levy (2006) , who conducted larger, more psychometrically sound studies of essentialist beliefs and prejudice than other researchers had done. Building on past research findings (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Whitley, 1990) , Haslam and Levy (2006) isolated a belief in the immutability of sexuality, associated with lower sexual prejudice, and a belief in the discreteness of sexual orientation, associated with higher sexual prejudice. These authors also isolated a third dimension of belief in the 'universality' of sexual orientation across culture and historical time. They found that belief in the universality of homosexuality was positively correlated with immutability beliefs and negatively correlated with discreteness beliefs and sexual prejudice. This three-factor structure was robust across beliefs about the sexualities of women and the sexualities of men.
Simultaneously new theories of the development sexual orientation became better informed by feminist critiques of research on sexuality, and described men's sexualities as more impervious to sociocultural and situational influence than women's sexualities (Baumeister, 2000; Diamond, 2003; Hammack, 2005) . These theories made sense of both existing findings that sexual minority men were less likely than sexual minority women to describe their identities as partially chosen (e.g., Golden, 1993; Savin-Williams, 1990) , and newer research showing that women's use of sexual identity labels often followed from their choice of female and male partners (Diamond, 2008) . These theories assumed that biological essentialist models of sexuality, such as genetic theories, fit men better than women. They further suggested that beliefs about male and female sexuality might differ from each other.
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Recent research in social psychology has tended to employ Haslam and Levy's (2006) framework. For example, Morton and Postmes (2009) studied the relationship between these three dimensions of essentialist belief and in-group identification among lesbians, gay men, and bisexual participants. Highly-identified participants endorsed beliefs in the universality of homosexuality the most, beliefs in discreteness did not co-vary with in-group identification, and beliefs in immutability co-varied with identification in situation-specific ways. Hegarty (2010) also used
Haslam and Levy's three-factor theory in a study of changes in attitudes and beliefs among students completing a university seminar on LGBT psychology; prejudice reduction was correlated only with a reduction in discreteness beliefs.
The Present Study
In spite of its increasing complexity, the literature on sexual prejudice and essentialism had two conceptual limits. First, researchers have tended to assume that essentialist beliefs about homosexuality are of great interest to the neglect of beliefs about heterosexuality. Second, researchers have not interrogated essentialist beliefs about different components of sexuality, and the emergence of multifactorial models required to explain women's sexuality further prompt the need for such understanding.
In Study 1 we tested whether beliefs about heterosexuality and homosexuality were equivalently strong, and in Study 2 we tested whether the relationships between sexual prejudice and essentialist beliefs about components of homosexuality and heterosexuality; love, behaviour, identity and desire were equivalent. By assessing relationships between essentialist beliefs about both homosexuality and heterosexuality and sexual prejudice, we aimed to both undo the effects of heterosexist ideology on this literature, and to investigate whether essentialist beliefs 9 reflected not only on 'sexual prejudice' but also on 'heterosexist ideology' (Herek, 2007) .
Study 1: Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality and Heterosexuality
Study 1 explored whether heterosexual and sexual minority people's essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality were the same or different. As beliefs about heterosexuality had not been examined previously in the literature, our hypothesis about the extent to which beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality would be similar or different were by necessity exploratory.
Method
Participants. Seventy three men and 63 women participated as volunteers (age range = 17 to 66 years, M = 26.91). Those who identified their sexualities as heterosexual or 'straight' (n= 106) were categorized as sexual majority participants.
Those who identified as bisexual (n=11), homosexual, gay or lesbian (n= 8), and other (n= 11) were categorized as sexual minority participants for statistical purposes.
Fourteen other participants who did not identify their sexuality, and one who failed to complete the essentialist belief measure were excluded from the analysis.
Materials. The materials consisted of the Essentialist Belief Scale used in
Haslam and Levy's (2006) third study, presented as a series of 6-point Likert items.
This 15-item scale includes 5 items that each measure three dimensions of essentialist belief: discreteness, immutability, and universality. Four versions of the questionnaire were constructed to operationalize a 2x2 experimental design. Two versions of the questionnaire asked about women's sexuality and two versions asked about men's sexuality. Within these conditions, one version of the questionnaire focused on homosexuality and the other focused on heterosexuality (see Appendix).
A demographic sheet followed the essentialist belief scale.
Procedure. Most participants were approached at public venues on campus and completed a paper copy of the questionnaire anonymously. Others were recruited via a snowball sampling method from the first researcher's personal contacts on social networking sites, and completed electronic questionnaires, which were returned them via email or posted to the researchers. Participants were randomly assigned to condition and all were debriefed as to the purpose of the study upon completing the materials.
Results
We calculated essentialism scores for each of the three sub-scales by averaging across the five items of each subscale. The discreteness variable had low reliability (α = 0.59), and inspection of the correlation matrix showed that Item 2 was not robustly correlated with the other items. Excluding this item raised Cronbach's α to .65 for this measure, and below we report analysis for the scale with this item removed. The measures of immutability, and universality had moderate reliability (α = .73, .63 respectively). While somewhat low, these reliability statistics are comparable with other studies which have used similar measures (e.g., Morton & Postmes, 2009) . Absolute values of kurtosis and skew were less than 1 for all three variables indicating their normal distribution.
We next examined whether essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality were equally strong or were different by conducting three 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAs. These ANOVAS had four between-subjects variables; target sexuality (heterosexual vs. homosexual), target gender (women vs. men), participant sexual identity (majority vs. minority), and participant gender (women vs. men). Each of the three essentialist beliefs served as a dependent variable in each of the analyses.
We examined belief in discreteness first. None of these independent variables or their interactions had significant effects on discreteness beliefs, all p >. 10 Correlations between beliefs in discreteness and immutability were not significant with regard to either homosexuality or heterosexuality, r = -.11, +.19 respectively.
Participant age was not significantly correlated with belief in immutability, discreteness or universality.
Discussion.
The most suggestive finding from our first exploratory study is that sexual minority and majority women and men reported greater belief in the universality of heterosexuality that in the universality of homosexuality. Similar differences in essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality were not observed with regard to beliefs about discreteness. The interacting effects of participant sex and target sexuality on beliefs about immutability must be regarded with some caution.
Our sample was small, and larger community samples report a very different effect such that sexual minority men report their sexualities as more immutable than do 13 sexual minority women (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009 ). In sum, universality beliefs emerged as the dimension where it appears most important to tease apart beliefs about 'sexuality' in general, from beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality.
Consequently, our second study examined beliefs about components of homosexuality and heterosexuality, and their relationship to sexual prejudice.
Study 2: Beliefs About the History of Homosexuality and Heterosexuality
In Study 1 people reported more belief in the universality of heterosexuality than in the universality of homosexuality. This effect might pertain to concepts such as heterosexist ideology (Herek, 2007) and heteronormativity (Warner, 1993) to varying extents. Because heterosexuality is implicated in human reproduction, it seems obvious and non-ideological that heterosexuality is universal across culture and history. As one participant in Study 1 wrote next to an item indicating agreement with the universality of heterosexuality, "of course, otherwise I wouldn't be doing this quiz." On the other hand, there was no obvious ceiling effect in participants' universality beliefs about heterosexuality, suggesting that this meaning is not the only one that people call to mind when they are asked to report their beliefs about heterosexuality. Indeed, sexuality is a multidimensional construct that involves such components as romantic love, sexual identity, and sexual desire (Diamond, 2003; DeCecco, 1982) , not all of which have a clear causal relationship to reproduction.
Showing an awareness of the differences between these components, another (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Hopkins & Reicher, 2001; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Liu & Hilton, 2005; McGarty et al., 2005; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Kahn, 2008; Zebel et al., 2007) . We discuss how our study engaged the 'essentialism-constructionism' debate among progay history scholars next.
The 'essentialism-constructionism' debate was prompted by the recognition that homosexual behaviour had occurred throughout history (see Stein, 1990) .
Within this debate, 'essentialists' tended to argue that such behaviour implied that people with homosexual identities existed in pre-modern periods (e.g., Boswell, 1994) , and "social constructionists" argued that homosexual identities only cohered in recent modern periods as sexuality became more central to Western concepts of personhood (Faderman, 1991; Foucault, 1978; Halperin, 2000) . Essentialism might appear to be a pro-gay strategy because the assertion that gay people have always existed seems to legitimate the rights of gay people to exist in the present. Indeed, belief in the universality of homosexuality is predictive of both lower sexual prejudice among heterosexuals (Haslam & Levy, 2006) and of higher identification with LGB identity among LGB people (Morton & Postmes, 2009 ). However, from a social constructionist perspective, the projection of gay identity back in time appears to be a case of 'hindsight bias' that overlooks the variable relationship between the components of sexuality across historical time (Fischhoff, 1975) .
Real-world events in the United States of America also suggested the possibility of pro-gay constructivist beliefs debate on the rights which sexual minority citizens enjoy. Sodomy laws in the United States were upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1986 Bowers vs. Hardwick ruling which equated the old crime of 'sodomy' with modern homosexual identity, such that homosexuality could have no legitimate place in the nation's traditions. This judgment limited the equal protection of sexual minorities quite severely in the subsequent years (Halley, 1993 (Halley, , 1994 . In Study 2 we examined heterosexual participants' sexual prejudice, and their beliefs about the universality of four components of sexuality across historical time;
love, identity, behaviour, and desire (Diamond, 2003; DeCecco, 1982) . Both the debate among historians, and the difference between the Supreme Court decisions on sodomy laws differ not on the matter of the historical universality of "sexuality" in a general sense, but specifically on the historical universality of sexual identity. Past social psychological studies of essentialist beliefs and sexual prejudice have not asked examined beliefs about components of sexuality separately, as we did here.
Method
Participants. Thirty five men and 34 women, who all identified as heterosexual, took part as volunteers (age = 18-64 years, the mean age was 25.80 (S.D.
10.49).

Materials
The questionnaires consisted of two parts. The historical essentialism measure was developed for this study, and consisted of 16 items, made up of four sets of four items, each about four components of sexuality; romantic love, sexual identity, sexual behaviour and sexual desire. For each component of sexuality, the first three items were presented as 6-point Likert items, and the fourth was an open-ended measure. Two versions of the measure were constructed that referred to homosexuality and heterosexuality respectively (see Appendix). Second, the questionnaire presented the modern homonegativity scale (Morrison &Morrison, 2002) , a 12-item measure of modern prejudice towards lesbians and gay men. All prejudice items were presented as 5-point Likert items. Demographic items were presented last.
Procedure. Participants were recruited using the same methods as Study 1 and were randomly assigned to condition.
Results
We first calculated historical universality scores. Individual 6-point Likert items were reverse coded where necessary such that high scores on all items indicated greater belief in historical universality. We standardized answers to the items in which the date of the emergence of sexuality was guessed. Based on participants'
responses, we constructed a 15-point scale representing different historical periods, from those furthest back in time to the most recent. The first point on this scale represented qualitative responses indicating absolute timelessness (e.g., 'forever,'
'always'). Points 2-5 represented four millennial time periods; 20,000 BCE to 10,001 BCE, 10,000 BCE to 5,001 BCE, 5,000 BCE-1 BCE, and 0 AD to 1,099 AD respectively. Points 6-15 represented guesses that fell within century long periods from 1,100 AD to the present. Scores on this 15 point scale were multiplied by 0.4 to render their range comparable to the other items and reverse coded. The four items on each sub-scale were then averaged to form reliable measures of romantic love (α = 0.75), sexual identity (α =0.81), sexual behaviour (α =0.83) and sexual desire (α =0.82). Two participants skipped some of the questions in which they guessed the date of emergence of sexuality, and thirteen participants skipped all of them. T-tests showed that mean scores did not differ on any of the subscales between participants who guessed the date of sexuality's emergence and those who did not, all t < 1.25, all p >.23. The relevant participants' scores were calculated as the average of the remaining three items. We also reverse coded the modern prejudice relevant items and averaged them to yield a reliable measure of modern prejudice (α =.87).
We tested whether essentialist beliefs about the components of homosexuality and heterosexuality differed first. We conducted a MANOVA including two between subjects factors; target sexuality (homosexuality vs. heterosexuality) and participant gender (female vs. male) and participants' beliefs in the universality of love, identity, behaviour and desire. Replicating the findings of Study 1, participants endorsed beliefs about the universality of heterosexuality significantly more than the comparable components of homosexuality, F (1, 65) = 8.80, p <.001, η p 2 = .36 (see Table 1 for specific effects). There was a marginally significant interaction between participant gender and target sexuality only in regard to beliefs about sexual identity, F (1, 65) = 3.76, p =.06, η p 2 =.06. Women and men reported similar beliefs about heterosexual identity (both M = 3.45), but men endorsed the universality of homosexuality somewhat more than women (Ms = 2.85, 2.10 respectively). Tukey's post hoc test (α = .05) revealed that this gender difference was not significant. As this non-significant, effect was opposite in direction to the non-significant gender interaction in Study 1, we did not interpret it further. All other main effects of gender and interactions were non-significant, F<1.5, all p >.23.
Next, we examined the correlations between essentialist beliefs and prejudice (see Table 2 ). Prejudice scores did not differ between participants who completed the items about homosexuality and the items about heterosexuality (Ms = 2.62, 2.48 respectively), t < 1. Relationships between universality beliefs and prejudice were unequal across target groups. As Table 2 shows, belief in the universality of love, behaviour, and desire were significantly negatively correlated with prejudice, but only in the homosexuality condition. However, universality beliefs about sexual identity
were not correlated with prejudice in either condition. Furthermore, while beliefs about the historical universality of different components of sexuality were almost universally positively correlated with each other, beliefs about the universality of homosexual identity were unrelated to the beliefs about the universality of homosexual love or homosexual desire. In other words, beliefs about the transhistorical universality of homosexual identity were distinct from beliefs about other components of homosexuality and no clear relationship to sexual prejudice. Among heterosexual people, the belief in the historical invariance of homosexual identity does not seem to be essential to a non-prejudiced attitude to lesbians and gay men.
Discussion
As in Study 1, participants in Study 2 endorsed beliefs about the universality of heterosexuality more than beliefs about the universality of homosexuality.
However, sexual prejudice was related to beliefs about the history of homosexual love, desire, and behaviour, but not to beliefs about homosexual identity. Both academic essentialist-constructivist debates turned and recent interpretations of sodomy law in the United States have turned on questions about the historical universality of sexual identity and not about the historical universality of sexuality. The finding that belief in the universality of homosexual identity is unrelated to prejudice may explain both why the more tolerant heterosexuals studied by Haslam and Levy (2006) and the more group-identified LGB people studied by Morton and Postmes (2009) ,are historical essentialists, and why many academics and Supreme Court judges can construct principled opposition to heterosexist ideology that assumes that sexual identities are not historically universal.
General Discussion
Beliefs about the universality of homosexuality and heterosexuality are not always mirror images of each other. Rather, people of diverse sexualities believe that heterosexuality is a more universal human experience than homosexuality (Study 1), and sexual majority people believe that homosexual love, identity behaviour and 20 desire have emerged in history more recently than their heterosexual counterparts (Study 2).
Our research provides a fresh perspective on the relationship between sexual prejudice and essentialist beliefs about universality. Only beliefs about homosexuality, and not beliefs about heterosexuality, were correlated with other forms of essentialist thinking (Study 1) and with sexual prejudice (Study 2). Past studies of universality beliefs about sexuality suggest that historical essentialism is a pro-lesbian/gay strategy (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Morton & Postmes, 2009) . By teasing apart beliefs about different components of sexuality in Study 2, the present research suggests that essentialist beliefs about sexual identity may not be as essential to resistance against heterosexism as some theories, such as attribution theory, suggest (e.g., Weiner, 1995; Whitley, 1990) .
Indeed, one of the curious features of ideologies that "other" is that they both deny the existence of the marked group and mark lower-status group features as different in the course of de-legitimating them. Consequently, members of sexual minority groups are disadvantaged both when their identities are not acknowledged, and when those identities are singled out as a cause for concern (see Herek, 2007; Meyer, 2003) . Because heterosexist ideology contains such contradictions, it is not surprising that the relationship between implicit theories of history and sexual prejudice is far from simple. Past studies (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Morton & Postmes, 2009 ) may have suggested that historical essentialism is the more pro-gay orientation to history than social constructionism. However, by teasing apart beliefs about different components of different sexualities, the present research suggests that such a conclusion would be premature. Like the justices who ruled in the 2004 Lawrence vs.
Texas case (see Tribe, 2004) , and pro-gay/lesbian social constructionist histories (e.g., Faderman, 1991; Halperin, 2000) , Study 2 shows how the belief that homosexual identity is a modern construction is not, in essence, a heterosexist belief.
Finally, the evidence of complex relationships between essentialist beliefs and sexual prejudice ought to urge caution about using essentialist beliefs as a means of ameliorating sexual prejudice among heterosexuals, as theorists of the first wave of theorizing tended to do (Whitley, 1990) . This interpretation overlooks pro-gay reasons to reject essentialist theories. Indeed, sexual prejudice is, in some places, becoming modern; and heterosexual people actively construct grounds to treat gay/lesbian people unfairly whilst appearing to treat them equally (Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001; Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002 : Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004 for evidence of modern sexual prejudice). Overlooking the complexity of reasons that people endorse or reject the biological theory could lead social psychologists to unintentionally collude with such modern prejudice by essentializing essentialist beliefs as either more or less pro-gay than they inherently are.
Like any empirical study, ours is open to criticisms about its scope.
Replication with broader samples and with different measures of prejudice would assess whether we have found a universal trend in beliefs about universality beliefs or only an "existence proof" that applies to relatively liberal and well-educated college students. The studies are less open to the criticism that our conclusions could be reinterpreted on the grounds that heterosexuality really is a more universal experience than homosexuality, because heterosexual behaviour leads to reproduction, while homosexual behaviour does not. and those above the diagonal refer to beliefs about heterosexuality (n = 39).
